Becker's Iowa Environmental Law Update : Iowa Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Charles Becker : Belin McCormick P.C. Law Firm : IA Regulatory Compliance, Site Cleanups

 Chalk this one up to old dogs and new tricks.

In a previous post, I discussed the politics of environmental law and the fact that, as a general matter, the Republican philosophy of environmental law is to consider costs versus benefits while the Democratic approach places considerably more emphasis on protecting the environment and much less on the cost of doing so. In many ways, this is at the heart of the differences between the parties when it comes to environmental regulation.

Since 1995, however, this difference hasn’t been very heavily debated because Republicans controlled Congress and, for the last eight years, the White House. During that time, EPA’s use of cost-benefit analysis has been fairly consistent. Not surprisingly, with a new sheriff in town (Democratic President and Democratic Congress), it has quickly become apparent that there will be significant changes in all aspects of environmental regulation. But given EPA’s historical use of cost-benefit analysis, how can it go about changing its tune? Let me ask it another way: If the President and this Congress want to make a change in environmental enforcement so that cost-benefit analysis plays a significantly reduced role, will it be like turning a barge or a speedboat? In light of the Entergy Corp. case, my guess is the latter.

In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of cost-benefit analysis in environmental regulation. Those who work in the area of the Clean Water Act are well aware of the five statutory standards found throughout the Act which are applicable to various situations. Those five standards are: 1) BTA (Best Technology Available); 2) BPT (Best Practicable Technology); 3) BATEA (Best Available Technology Economically Achievable); 4) BADT (Best Available Demonstrated Technology); 5) BCT (Best Control Technology). (I’ve always been consoled by the fact that each and every one of these standards is the “best”). If you did not have all of these committed to memory, don’t be embarrassed. The Court actually found it necessary to add an appendix to its opinion which set out the definition of the terms.

In the case, the Court was confronted with the question of whether the use of the BTA standard should include a balancing of costs against benefits. After conducting an analysis of the statutory language, the Court finally found that the choice is up to EPA. The Court could not identify any prohibition against EPA including a cost-benefit analysis in setting health and safety standards under BTA if it chose to do so. In the words of the Court:

 [I]t was well within the bounds of reasonable interpretation for the EPA  to  conclude that cost-benefit analysis is not categorically forbidden.

The Court then went on to look at what the EPA’s BTA standard actually was and determined that, historically, EPA had employed the standard that technology would not be required if the cost was “wholly disproportionate to the environmental benefit to be gained.” However, the standard employed in the case at bar was that the changes would not be required if the costs of compliance were “significantly greater than” the benefits of complying with the applicable performance standards. In discussing the change in terminology by EPA between these two standards, the Court said:

While the EPA’s prior “wholly disproportionate” standard may be somewhat different from its current “significantly greater than” standard, there is nothing in the statute that would indicate that the former is a permissible interpretation while the latter is not.

Maybe it’s been a slow month, but I find these statements very interesting. First, the Court found that use of the cost-benefit analysis is permitted because it isn’t “categorically forbidden.” Then the Court recognized that EPA has changed its standard, but approved the use of either one.

The partial concurrence and dissent by Justice Breyer took the Court to task. He agreed that the EPA could include a cost-benefit component but he felt that if EPA was employing a new and different test, it was incumbent on EPA to adequately explain why it had changed its standard. Since it had not done so, Justice Breyer would have ordered a remand to EPA so that EPA could either apply the traditional “wholly disproportionate” standard or provide an adequately reasoned explanation for the change.

It seems to me that Justice Breyer has a point. If EPA is going to change its standards (which could be change that would be either looser or tighter) from what it has been using for the past 5 or 10 years, maybe it should be required to explain itself. Maybe applying a particular standard on a business is tough enough without the possibility of that standard changing each time there is a change in the administration and/or the head of EPA. Maybe there is something to be said for consistent application of the environmental laws so that business can at least plan and prepare. Naaah...said the United States Supreme Court.

In my mind, the significant holding of the Entergy Corporation case is that on something as fundamental as the use and proper application of cost-benefit analysis, EPA has discretion to employ that analysis (unless categorically prohibited) and EPA (read that to be each new EPA administrator) can modify that standard with impunity and without notice. While the decision certainly allows an agency, in this case EPA, to quickly adjust to new political realities, it wreaks havoc with business planning.

I started this post by referencing the old-dog-new-tricks maxim. However, I would like it understood that I am certainly not calling EPA an old dog. All I'm trying to say is that EPA’s ability to change its standards without notice does seem to be a new trick . . . and that it’s a shame that the majority of the Court didn’t require EPA to notice up and justify the change before it bit someone with it.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

I’ve written about the Shell Oil finding in the case of Burlington Northern and Sante Fe Railroad Co., et al. v. United States, et al. in a prior post. Allow me to turn to a review of the Court’s decision regarding the liability of the railroads for the cleanup of the B&B facility.

Not unexpectedly, the Supreme Court based its finding of liability on the fact that the railroads owned a portion of the site in question.  As you can see from the diagram in the Court’s opinion, the portion of the property owned by the railroad (the "Leased Property") was less than 20% of the total land being used by B&B.  (My father once told me that in the rare instance where a court decision includes a diagram, do not ignore it.  The Court is trying to say that the answer is obvious and to make sure you get it, they are going to draw you a picture. District and circuit courts around the country should take note: the Supreme Court drew them a picture.)  Some other relevant facts relating to the property were: 

               • B&B commenced in 1960 but did not begin leasing the railroad property until 1975;
               • All of the property was graded to slope to the pond;
               • Only two of the three chemicals were released on the railroad parcel;
               • Not all of the releases ended up at the pond; and
               • None of the D-D chemical needed to be remediated on the railroad property.

The District Court apportioned  to the railroads 9% of the total remediation costs. This was based on three factors. First, the railroad parcel constituted 19% of the surface area of the total site. Second, the railroad parcels had been leased to B&B for only 45% of the time B&B operated the facility. Third, the volume of hazardous-substance-releasing activities on the B&B property was at least ten times greater than the releases that occurred on the railroad parcel and that only spills of two chemicals (not D-D) substantially contributed to the contamination that had originated on the railroad parcel and that those two chemicals had contributed to two-thirds of the overall site contamination requiring remediation. The District Court, with calculator in hand, then multiplied .19 x .45 by .66 to get 6% of the remediation costs. It then added 3% for “calculation error.” The Supreme Court spent some time picking through the available facts, but ultimately concluded that there was reasonable support for the 9% apportionment.

I have to tell you, I was shocked (though, to be fair, I shock easily). It isn’t that 9% is a crazy number, it’s that the Court agreed, under these facts, that any apportionment was appropriate.  Remember, the Court had eliminated Shell as a PRP and B & B had no money, so the only parties left to help pay the bill were the railroads. By finding an apportionment possible, the Court guaranteed that 91% of the cleanup costs would be left with the government.

Moreover, it’s not as though the facts screamed out for a division. In fact, the Court lamented that the railroads had taken a “scorched earth” all-or-nothing approach to litigating their potential liability. They failed to acknowledge any responsibility for the release of hazardous substances on their parcel during the lease. On the other hand, the Government refused to acknowledge any potential divisibility of harm. Between the two of them, they provided only minimal input to facts that would allow divisibility. Nevertheless, the District Court and the Supreme Court found divisibility. In the words of the Court:  

Despite these criticisms, we conclude that the facts contained in the record reasonably supported the apportionment of liability. 

        
In the past, I have been surprised that courts have routinely refused to find divisibility in Superfund cases. I know that it is hard to quantify the factors that justify divisibility, but it seems to me that the fact that divisibility is difficult to do, doesn’t mean it shouldn’t be done. In my own mind, I have rationalized that divisibility has not been “encouraged” in the environmental arena because when divisibility is found, it will often mean that a large portion of the remediation costs will be left with the government (i.e. tax-paying public), which frustrates the concept of "polluter pays."
 

I would suggest to district courts and circuit courts throughout the country, a new day has dawned. If apportionment was possible under the facts given to the Court in Burlington Northern, there aren’t going to be a lot of cases in which apportionment is not possible. Of course, they all will stand or fall on their own facts and I am sure we are going to have a number of very interesting fact scenarios with some very creative reasons for divisibility. However, the really significant holding of Burlington Northern, it seems to me, is that where there used to be a presumption against apportionment in Superfund cases, there is now a presumption in favor of it. That, for better or worse, is a very big change.
 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Just when you think you have them figured out, the Supreme Court throws a curve ball.

Much will be written about the recent United States Supreme Court case of Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company, et al. vs. United States, et al., which was handed down on May 4, 2009. It is one of those decisions in the environmental arena that answers some questions while raising new ones.

An understanding of the facts is critically important to understand the ruling, so I would encourage you to read the decision. However, the short version of the operative facts is that a fairly small chemical distributor in California known as Brown and Bryant, Inc. (“B&B”) was the owner and operator of a plant that repackaged agricultural chemicals. The plant sat on a 4.7 acre parcel. About 1 acre of this parcel was leased from two railroads. One of the products made by B&B included a chemical sold by Shell Oil Company. Shell Oil shipped the product to B&B in bulk. During delivery of the product, Shell was aware that B&B occasionally had minor spills.

Not surprisingly, the site was found to have soil and groundwater contamination and, in 1988, the California Environmental Regulatory Agency ordered B&B to clean the soil and groundwater. As is often the case, B&B closed shop and the site was listed on the National Priority List in 1989. EPA, in trying to find someone to do the cleanup, quickly identified the railroads and Shell Oil, which were named as potentially responsible parties (PRPs). The theory against the railroads was based on ownership liability, even though the portion they owned did not require remediation. The theory against Shell was that they delivered chemicals which they knew or should have known would be spilled and therefore “arranged” for the disposal of a hazardous substance. Since the United States and the State of California had expended costs at the site for cleanup, they brought an action for cost recovery seeking over $8 million in response costs. 

The Court made two major findings. First, the 8-1 decision authored by Justice Stevens held that Shell was not liable at all because it did not “arrange for” disposal of a hazardous substance. The second major finding was that the facts supported an apportionment of the site remediation costs and that the railroad share of those costs should be 9%. 

Since the case raises several interesting questions, I’ll break the discussion down into separate posts. Let’s first talk about the fact that Shell was found to have no liability.

Since Shell was not an owner or operator of the site, the only PRP category that could fit was “arranger” liability. There have been many cases that have imposed liability on companies that have “arranged for the disposal” of hazardous substances.   Interesting, Superfund does not define the term so the Court decided it was time to define it. The Ninth Circuit, based on prior cases, held that someone who sells a useful product but is aware that some of it will spill is liable as an arranger. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that an arranger must take intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance. The fact that Shell had knowledge of the spills was not sufficient to satisfy the intent element that can be found in the “plain language” of the terms of the statute. The Court said:

While it is true that in some instances an entity’s knowledge that its product will be leaked, spilled, dumped, or otherwise discarded may provide evidence of the entity’s intent to dispose of its hazardous wastes, knowledge alone is insufficient to prove that an entity “planned for” the disposal, particularly when the disposal occurs as a peripheral result of the legitimate sale of an unused, useful product. In order to qualify as an arranger, Shell must have entered into the sale of D-D with the intention that at least a portion of the product be disposed of during the transfer process by one or more of the methods described in Section 6903(3). Here, the facts found by the District Court do not support such a conclusion.

When I first saw this explanation, I thought it was a monumental change from the past. Upon further reflection, maybe not so much. 

Maybe the Supreme Court is just kicking the proverbial verbal can down the road a little bit. It appears that the new question is: what do the terms “intention” and “planned for” really mean? Based on the Court’s language, I am certain that if Shell had included, as a term of the sale, that B&B would agree “that during the process of the transfer of the chemical, B&B shall leak some of it onto the ground,” Shell would have been hooked.  On the other hand, the Court made it clear that since Shell knew of the releases, but did nothing other than to take steps to encourage its distributors to reduce the likelihood of the spills, the necessary “intent” was not present. So what’s in between? What if Shell had known of the spills and had not encouraged its distributors to reduce the likelihood of the spills (a fact scenario which is much more likely in most situations)? What if Shell had a contract with its common carrier that said that the carrier will not inform Shell of any spills? Will willful blindness avoid an intent finding? We’ll just have to wait for the next set of facts.

With regard to our definitional problem, I would note an interesting fact that did not seem to bother the Court: Beginning in the mid-1960s, Shell directed its buyers to create and maintain bulk storage facilities to receive its product rather than to continue to deliver the product in 30 and 55-gallon drums. Presumably this was advantageous to Shell. But as the Court later noted, Shell’s mandated system caused spills to be "commonplace" (there was no reference to spills occurring when the barrel system was used). A cynical person might say that someone who requires a change from a system of no releases to one that virtually guarantees releases, particularly when the change results in an advantage to the supplier, has “planned for” and ”intended” a disposal. Luckily, neither the Supreme Court nor I are cynics.

Another very interesting aspect of this issue was raised by a question during oral argument. Shell’s counsel was asked what would be the difference if the transfer of ownership of product did not occur until the final placement of the product in the tank and that, during that process, the spilling occurred. The response was that “Shell would have been the owner of the waste.” The majority found, however, that the product had been shipped “FOB Destination” and that, at the time of the spills, the chemicals had come under B&B’s "stewardship." In essence, once the truck passed over the property line to B&B’s facility, the Court deemed B&B to be the owner of the product and, in turn, the owner of the spills. If the Court had found that Shell Oil remained the owner of the product until it was in B&B’s tank, Shell would have been liable. You might say that Shell avoided liability by the length of a football field. The dissent by Justice Ginsberg makes the interesting point that

CERCLA liability, or the absence thereof, should not turn, in any part, on such an eminently shipper-fixable specification as “FOB Destination.”

So what are some of the practical results to take from the holding of arranger liability in the case?  You need to talk to your attorney for his/her advise, but allow me to throw out some possibilities:

• Any seller of products containing a hazardous substance should consider including, in the sale document and on a warning label attached to the product, terminology that it is the intention of the seller that none of its product be released into the environment and that buyer should not allow the spilling, leaking, or other disposal into the air, ground or water at any time. And it might be helpful to add: “We really, really mean it.”
• A term of the sale might be that notwithstanding the terms of any shipping documents to the contrary, buyer agrees to become the owner of the product no later than the moment the product crosses the buyer’s property line. 
• If the buyer wants some protection, they should consider a contract term that says that the buyer does not accept or own any product until it is completely within the confines of a tank or has been delivered to the warehouse and the delivery person has left the premises, or at least gone on break. 

I don’t know that any of these will work, but I can say that if “intention” is the new litmus test, putting your intentions in writing might not be a bad idea (even if they might be technically impossible).

Next up, tracking the railroads' liability.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

As many of you know, a new era in purchasing environmentally contaminated (or possibly contaminated) land began in November, 2006. That is when new federal rules relating to All Appropriate Inquiry commenced and allowed new defenses to CERCLA liability for buyers of real estate. Without going into a lot of detail, the rule allows buyers to limit Superfund liability if they conduct a Phase I Environmental Site Assessment, in accordance with the rules, prior to purchasing the real estate. Under these circumstances, an individual or a company theoretically will not be liable for remediation of the property even if it is contaminated. However, in order to maintain the defenses, there are certain continuing obligations that are imposed on the buyer. These include complying with land use restrictions and institutional controls, responding to information requests and administrative subpoenas and providing legally required notices. Most importantly, there is a requirement of taking “reasonable steps” with respect to hazardous substance releases, and therein lies the problem.

The obvious question that is raised is what constitutes reasonable steps? If, for example, reasonable steps requires the removal of the hazardous substance from the ground, then EPA has effectively gutted the defense.

As a general rule, reasonable steps would include stopping any continuing release, preventing any threatened future release, and preventing or limiting human, environmental or natural resource exposure to any hazardous substance released on or from the property. But does it, for example, require a Phase II audit to identify the nature and extent of the suspected contamination? Does it require capping the contaminated soils with clay or asphalt? Does it require some sort of vapor intrusion protection around the basement of a building to avoid gas buildup?

ASTM has organized the Continuing Obligation Task Group to work on a draft continuing obligation standard which will define “reasonable steps.” Currently, it appears that the Group has identified two actions that may be taken to meet the requirement. They are: (a) lower the contaminate levels, also known as remediation; or (b) prevent exposure to the contamination through institutional or engineering controls. Obviously, both of these actions also require a Phase II site assessment and both could be extremely expensive to a purchaser.

I would suggest that if the ASTM Task Group does require these actions or something close to these actions, we will essentially be back to the pre-2006 days of sites having any potential contamination being difficult to market because banks will mandate a Phase II and, if any contaminate is discovered, bank financing will dry up.

I’ll let you know as soon as I hear the edict of the ASTM Task Group.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link