City Superfund Liability Goes Down the Drain

In September of 2009, the federal district court for the Eastern District of California issued a ruling in Adobe Lumber, Inc. v. Hellman.  If the holding catches on, it should scare the sewage out of every city in the country.

The facts are fairly unremarkable as Superfund facts go. Between 1974 and 2001, a shopping center, owned by Adobe Lumber,  housed a dry cleaning business. A floor drain from the dry cleaners connected to the sewer system for the City of Woodland, California through a waste pipe. The dry cleaning operators used the floor drain to dispose of waste water containing perchlorethylene, which is a hazardous substance under CERCLA.  In 2001, it was determined that PCE from the dry cleaning establishment had contaminated the soils and groundwater. So far, not too surprising. 

The interesting aspect of the case is that the plaintiff chose to include the City in the lawsuit. The plaintiff''s claim against the City was that the contamination was a result of the leakage of PCE from the sewer system and that the sewer system was

especially likely to leak due to … its age, the large number of joints, grout (mortared) joints and defects in the sewer system and that the city’s management and maintenance of the sewer system was re-active, minimal, and inadequate.

In suing the City, the plaintiff sought declaratory relief and cost recovery under CERCLA as well as several other theories. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the CERCLA claim under the theory that the City, as the owner and operator of the sanitary sewer system, had liability for any leaking hazardous substances from those facilities. 

The court first addressed the question of whether the sewer pipes constituted a “facility” under CERCLA. The court noted that the term “facility enjoys a broad and detailed definition.” (For those who don’t read a lot of cases, this kind of language is a bad sign). The court then found that the sewer pipes can be deemed a facility because the statutory language identifies a facility as any site or area where a hazardous substance has been disposed of or comes to be located. The court could find no language to exclude the city’s sewer system, so it held that the pipe was a “facility” under CERCLA.

The court then went on to determine whether the city was an owner or operator of the facility. This one, however, was easier because there was no question but that the city owned the sewer system.

Finally, the city asserted the innocent landowner defense. The elements of that defense are that the defendant must prove that: 1) the release or threat of release of hazardous substances was caused solely by the acts of a third party, and 2) the defendant exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substances and took precautions against foreseeable third acts or omissions. The Court found that neither of the elements were satisfied.

First, the court found that the dry cleaners did not constitute the “sole” cause because the City allowed the sewer lines to degenerate to the state which allowed the releases to occur. 

Second, the court found that though the dry cleaner's conduct clearly violated state and local law, that did not render the conduct unforeseeable as a matter of law. The evidence showed that the City did not take steps to remedy the leaks in the sewer system until 2004 even though it was aware that several dry cleaners did operate in the area. The court found that it was foreseeable that the City would be aware that PCE could be illegally discharged from these facilities and the City was required to take “reasonable steps” to prevent ongoing contamination, which the City did not do until 2004. Therefore, the City was the “owner” and “operator” of a “facility” that allowed the release of a hazardous substance.

I believe it is safe to say that the City was surprised at the outcome.

There is still a long way to go and appeals to be had, but, based on the cases cited by the court, there is every reason to believe that the City will ultimately be one of those parties who gets allocated some of the response costs for this clean up. It will be interesting to see if the Burlington Northern case lets them get out for a low percentage.

The real import to this case, in my mind, is that it, once again, highlights the idea that the “polluter pays” under CERCLA is often not true. The environmental regulatory schemes under both federal and many state laws are much less concerned with who caused a hazardous release than they are with who can be easily located to pay for the clean up of a hazardous release. And while that may be expedient, it is a far cry from making the polluter pay as that phrase is understood by most people.

 

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CERCLA Operator Liability: A Tragedy in One Act

The principle of "polluter pays" for environmental contamination and the activity of land development have always been uneasy bedfellows.  The most recent example of a sleepless night can be found in the New Jersey federal district court case of Bonnieview Homeowner’s Association v. Woodmont Builders, LLC.  In a foreshadowing of things to come, Judge Deberoise’s opening line, in that case says:

This matter involves a dispute over the environmental contamination of an area of land in Montville, New Jersey, where a fruit orchard was operated in the mid-twentieth century and which was later developed into a residential neighborhood.

There is not a single well-read developer that doesn’t understand that by the end of the opinion, this is a tragedy of epic proportions.

The facts of Bonnieview HOA are the ones that every developer fears. A seemingly innocuous parcel of ground is ripe for development in the lovely city of Montville, New Jersey. At some point in the past, the property had been an apple orchard, though a Phase I Environmental Site Assessment failed to note that the orchards may have used pesticides which may have contaminated the soils.

The developer of the site, in an effort to provide the finest of “natural homesites” with a “great place to raise children” removed the topsoil from the site, stockpiled it, built the homes and returned the topsoil to the site for the lawns. No testing of the soils was done before or during the process, but, as luck (and tragedy) would have it, the soils were heavily contaminated with metals and pesticides.

The Plaintiff homeowner’s association, after discovering the facts, brought action against the developers and others contending that:

[B]y clearing the topsoil, stockpiling it, then spreading it over the Residential Lots, the Defendants caused the pesticide contamination to spread “ubiquitously across the Residential Lots” and into areas previously not contaminated, and to be extended from the surface into the subsurface soil.

Liability under CERCLA, the federal statute that requires cleanup of contaminated property, for a person operating on the property (such as a developer) requires that the operations occur at a time during which there was a disposal of a hazardous substance. In this case, there was no question that the pesticides in the soil constituted a hazardous substance. The open question was whether the mere movement of the previously contaminated soils constituted “disposal.” The Court conducted an analysis of the case law and found:

Woodmont Builders’ movement of the contaminated soils on the Residential Lots may be considered a “disposal” under CERCLA.

Ironically, the members of the Plaintiff homeowner’s association that had moved soils to put in swimming pools, driveways, etc. were also found to be liable for response costs.

It is important to note that the Court acknowledged that the developers were not liable as arrangers (due to the recent holding of Burlington Northern Railroad) but found that the developers were liable based on operator liability, which does not require knowledge of the presence of a contaminant for liability to be imposed.

There are several other interesting aspects of the case, but the fact that a developer (or a homeowner) who moves around soil that turns out to be contaminated can be responsible for response costs is the most problematic. Environmental attorneys who practice in the area of CERCLA are not particularly surprised at the outcome, but I haven't met a developer yet who isn't shocked.  It is yet another instance where the “polluter pays” principle means (tragically) very little.

 

RELATED POSTS:  City Superfund Liability Goes Down the Drain

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