Becker's Iowa Environmental Law Update : Iowa Environmental Lawyer & Attorney : Charles Becker : Belin McCormick P.C. Law Firm : IA Regulatory Compliance, Site Cleanups

During the 1990s, there was an interesting string of Superfund actions that addressed what turned out to be a common problem. Many products that contain hazardous materials are shipped in 55 gallon drums. When the drums arrive at their destination, usually a manufacturing facility, the product is used. The question is, what do you do with the empty drums? Since many facilities have no use for the drums, there developed a business that was willing to accept the drums, clean them up and resell them. The problem was that the drums often contained some of the hazardous material. The drums were “RCRA empty,” but that designation allows some material to remain in the drum. Many of these refurbishing companies were a bit . . . lax . . .  in their cleanup procedure and the residual product ended up on the ground. When the contamination was discovered, the company was often unable to pay for the cleanup.  EPA would review all the records of the company and usually pursued the top 10 drum suppliers.  These top 10 suppliers formed a committee, looked through the receipts and went after the other 500 -- or 5000 -- customers who had supplied the facility with drums. EPA was extremely successful in its endeavor and a large number of these “drum-and-barrel” facilities were cleaned up by thousands of unsuspecting companies that had sent the barrels to the facilities only to find, many years later, that mishandling of the barrels cost them a lot more money and time.

EPA’s underlying theory for this recovery was that all persons are responsible for hazardous materials from “cradle-to-grave.” It's one of those catch-phrases that rolls off the tongue so easily.  It means that once you buy a hazardous material, you are responsible for every drop of it until its final disposition either by incorporation into a product or by arranging for its proper disposal.

A recent case from the Federal District Court of Connecticut (which will certainly be repeated) illustrates that a lot can happen in a decade or two.

In the case of Schiavone and Harbor Circles, LLC v. Northeast Utilities Service Company, the defendants, from 1971 through 1978, would obtain and drain electrical transformers of their PCB-containing oil. They then sold the transformers to a scrap yard. Not surprisingly, the sale contract made no reference to the residual PCBs or the disposal of hazardous substances.  As you would guess, the scrap yard was eventually identified as a clean up site for PCBs and the suppliers of the scrap transformers were pursued. The Court first noted that the plaintiff failed to show that the transformers supplied to the scrap yard had any PCBs left in them. However, the Court went on to say that even if PCBs had been included, it would not matter. The District Court stated:

It is undisputed that the defendants had a specific purpose of disposing of used transformers, and in the case of the sales to Kasden, by selling them as scrap metal.  The defendants have produced evidence that would support a conclusion that their specific purpose with respect to their dealings with Kasen did not extend beyond that, i.e., to disposing of any oil that was In the transformers or any PCBs that were in such oil. . . .

[T]he defendants’ specific intent to dispose of the transformers themselves is not enough to make them “arrangers” under Section 9607(a), even if the defendants had knowledge that oil was in the used transformers when they sold them to Kasden. [Citing to Burlington Northern v. United States]. The plaintiffs have produced no evidence that could support a conclusion that the defendants had as a purpose in their dealings with Kasden disposing of transformer oil containing PCBs.

The Court sustained the defendants’ motion for summary judgment because the intent element of arranging for disposal could not be established even if the actual release could be.  Put another way, if an inevitable release is certain to happen based on the product supplied, but the supplier really hopes that the certainty will not occur, then the supplier is not responsible for the release. State of mind, particularly one rooted in fantasy, is a wonderful thing.

Still, it's hard to criticize Judge Thomson’s conclusion. It certainly fits with the holding of Burlington Northern. After all, if you intend no harm, why should you have to pay for it when it happens?  In slightly different terms, I have gotten the same question from my five-year old. It is a bit disturbing to know that he now has the backing of the Supreme Court.  

My only question is, now what? Are these orphan sites going to be cleaned up by EPA? Doesn’t this just shift the cost of cleanup from the refurbishing company to the public? Don’t get me wrong, perhaps that's the "fair" result. I just think someone should tell Congress while they are considering reauthorization of the Superfund tax. 

And while we’re at it, do the thousands of individuals and companies who paid to clean up the old drum-and-barrel sites get their money back? I’m just wondering.

RELATED POSTS:

R.I.P. Superfund Arranger Liability: 1980 - 2010

Burlington Norther (Part 1): The Shell Game Of Shipping

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It looks like the last vestiges of arranger liability under CERCLA are all but gone.

In a recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Celanese Corp. v. Martin Eby Construction Company, Inc., the Court addressed what would seem to be a fairly common set of facts. In 1979, the Coastal Water Authority of Texas hired Eby to install an underground water pipeline which was to cross several existing underground pipelines, including Celanese’s methanol pipeline. Eby did this by excavating an area to work which exposed the methanol pipeline. Eby then ran a section of the water pipeline below the methanol pipeline and backfilled that area. It then moved onto the next section and repeated the same process.

Not particularly surprisingly, at one point in the process an Eby employee struck and damaged the methanol pipeline with the backhoe. However, according to the recited facts, that employee did not know what he had struck and there was no contemporaneous report of the incident. According to the opinion, “neither Eby nor any of its employees knew that the work on the CWA pipeline had damaged the Celanese pipeline.”

The opinion does not go into a lengthy description of the damage to the pipeline. However, it does say that over the course of several years, the dented pipe deteriorated and eventually allowed methanol to leak from the pipe. The leaking was discovered in 2002 and by 2008, Celanese had removed and disposed of over 232,000 gallons of methanol.

Celanese sued Eby under CERCLA to recover its clean-up costs. An advisory jury found that the release at the site would not have occurred but for the 1979 damage to the methanol line. However, the Court also found that Eby did not intentionally damage the pipeline.

The Fifth Circuit reviewed the United States Supreme Court case of Burlington Northern  v. United States and found that Eby could not be held liable as an arranger. The reasoning was that under Burlington Northern, Eby could be liable as an arranger “only if it took intentional steps or planned to release methanol from the Celanese pipeline.” Since Eby did not intentionally damage the pipeline and allegedly did not even know it had struck the pipeline, the intent element of arranger liability could not be satisfied.

On appeal, and for the first time, Celanese argued that the only reason that Eby did not know that it had struck the pipeline was it “consciously disregarded” its obligation to investigate what it had hit in the pipeline corridor and to rectify the damage. This concept, which will become very prevalent in future arranger-liability cases, is also known as “willful blindness.”  The general concept is that the actor intentionally fails to investigate or to acquire information in order to avoid having the necessary knowledge that could satisfy the intent requirement of Burlington Northern.

As one would expect, the Fifth Circuit first said that the new claim could not be considered because it was untimely argued. However, the Court went on to say that even if it had been presented, it would be unsuccessful. The Fifth Circuit returned to the reasoning of Burlington Northern:

Celanese argues that Eby’s conscious disregard of its duty to investigate is tantamount to intentionally taking steps to dispose of methanol. Burlington, however, precludes liability under these circumstances. In Burlington, the Court declined to impose arranger liability for a defendant with more culpable mens rea. The defendant had actually arranged to ship hazardous chemicals under conditions that it knew would result in the spilling of a portion of the hazardous substance by the purchaser or common carrier . . . . Given that there was no arranger liability under those circumstances, we fail to see how we can impose such liability here when Eby did not even know that it had struck the Celanese pipeline. Therefore, we hold that Eby is not liable as an arranger under CERCLA.

This is a pretty remarkable holding. The Fifth Circuit is saying that even if Eby had chosen to avoid doing further investigation, it would not have arranger liability because it had not intended to dispose of a hazardous substance. It was, in essence, an accidental act that caused a release. And since no one intends an accident, there is no liability. (I remember making this argument to my parents many times in my formative years. It didn’t work. Though too late by forty years, it feels good to be vindicated by a federal court of appeals).

Stepping back and looking at the bigger picture (always a mistake in doing a legal analysis), it is undisputed that Eby caused damage to a pipeline that resulted in a massive release of a hazardous substance over the course of several years and, despite these facts, Eby cannot be held liable for the release as an arranger.  How’s that “polluter pays" principle working for you?

Post Script: I wonder if Eby leased the backhoe?  If so, perhaps Celanese can sue the backhoe owner under a theory that the leased equipment caused the release. Just a thought.
 

RELATED POSTS: Burlington Northern (Part 1): The Shell Game of Shipping 

                              U.S. v. Saporito: Superfund Liability For Equipment Leases

                              City Superfund Liability Goes Down the Drain

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I’ve written about the Shell Oil finding in the case of Burlington Northern and Sante Fe Railroad Co., et al. v. United States, et al. in a prior post. Allow me to turn to a review of the Court’s decision regarding the liability of the railroads for the cleanup of the B&B facility.

Not unexpectedly, the Supreme Court based its finding of liability on the fact that the railroads owned a portion of the site in question.  As you can see from the diagram in the Court’s opinion, the portion of the property owned by the railroad (the "Leased Property") was less than 20% of the total land being used by B&B.  (My father once told me that in the rare instance where a court decision includes a diagram, do not ignore it.  The Court is trying to say that the answer is obvious and to make sure you get it, they are going to draw you a picture. District and circuit courts around the country should take note: the Supreme Court drew them a picture.)  Some other relevant facts relating to the property were: 

               • B&B commenced in 1960 but did not begin leasing the railroad property until 1975;
               • All of the property was graded to slope to the pond;
               • Only two of the three chemicals were released on the railroad parcel;
               • Not all of the releases ended up at the pond; and
               • None of the D-D chemical needed to be remediated on the railroad property.

The District Court apportioned  to the railroads 9% of the total remediation costs. This was based on three factors. First, the railroad parcel constituted 19% of the surface area of the total site. Second, the railroad parcels had been leased to B&B for only 45% of the time B&B operated the facility. Third, the volume of hazardous-substance-releasing activities on the B&B property was at least ten times greater than the releases that occurred on the railroad parcel and that only spills of two chemicals (not D-D) substantially contributed to the contamination that had originated on the railroad parcel and that those two chemicals had contributed to two-thirds of the overall site contamination requiring remediation. The District Court, with calculator in hand, then multiplied .19 x .45 by .66 to get 6% of the remediation costs. It then added 3% for “calculation error.” The Supreme Court spent some time picking through the available facts, but ultimately concluded that there was reasonable support for the 9% apportionment.

I have to tell you, I was shocked (though, to be fair, I shock easily). It isn’t that 9% is a crazy number, it’s that the Court agreed, under these facts, that any apportionment was appropriate.  Remember, the Court had eliminated Shell as a PRP and B & B had no money, so the only parties left to help pay the bill were the railroads. By finding an apportionment possible, the Court guaranteed that 91% of the cleanup costs would be left with the government.

Moreover, it’s not as though the facts screamed out for a division. In fact, the Court lamented that the railroads had taken a “scorched earth” all-or-nothing approach to litigating their potential liability. They failed to acknowledge any responsibility for the release of hazardous substances on their parcel during the lease. On the other hand, the Government refused to acknowledge any potential divisibility of harm. Between the two of them, they provided only minimal input to facts that would allow divisibility. Nevertheless, the District Court and the Supreme Court found divisibility. In the words of the Court:  

Despite these criticisms, we conclude that the facts contained in the record reasonably supported the apportionment of liability. 

        
In the past, I have been surprised that courts have routinely refused to find divisibility in Superfund cases. I know that it is hard to quantify the factors that justify divisibility, but it seems to me that the fact that divisibility is difficult to do, doesn’t mean it shouldn’t be done. In my own mind, I have rationalized that divisibility has not been “encouraged” in the environmental arena because when divisibility is found, it will often mean that a large portion of the remediation costs will be left with the government (i.e. tax-paying public), which frustrates the concept of "polluter pays."
 

I would suggest to district courts and circuit courts throughout the country, a new day has dawned. If apportionment was possible under the facts given to the Court in Burlington Northern, there aren’t going to be a lot of cases in which apportionment is not possible. Of course, they all will stand or fall on their own facts and I am sure we are going to have a number of very interesting fact scenarios with some very creative reasons for divisibility. However, the really significant holding of Burlington Northern, it seems to me, is that where there used to be a presumption against apportionment in Superfund cases, there is now a presumption in favor of it. That, for better or worse, is a very big change.
 

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Just when you think you have them figured out, the Supreme Court throws a curve ball.

Much will be written about the recent United States Supreme Court case of Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company, et al. vs. United States, et al., which was handed down on May 4, 2009. It is one of those decisions in the environmental arena that answers some questions while raising new ones.

An understanding of the facts is critically important to understand the ruling, so I would encourage you to read the decision. However, the short version of the operative facts is that a fairly small chemical distributor in California known as Brown and Bryant, Inc. (“B&B”) was the owner and operator of a plant that repackaged agricultural chemicals. The plant sat on a 4.7 acre parcel. About 1 acre of this parcel was leased from two railroads. One of the products made by B&B included a chemical sold by Shell Oil Company. Shell Oil shipped the product to B&B in bulk. During delivery of the product, Shell was aware that B&B occasionally had minor spills.

Not surprisingly, the site was found to have soil and groundwater contamination and, in 1988, the California Environmental Regulatory Agency ordered B&B to clean the soil and groundwater. As is often the case, B&B closed shop and the site was listed on the National Priority List in 1989. EPA, in trying to find someone to do the cleanup, quickly identified the railroads and Shell Oil, which were named as potentially responsible parties (PRPs). The theory against the railroads was based on ownership liability, even though the portion they owned did not require remediation. The theory against Shell was that they delivered chemicals which they knew or should have known would be spilled and therefore “arranged” for the disposal of a hazardous substance. Since the United States and the State of California had expended costs at the site for cleanup, they brought an action for cost recovery seeking over $8 million in response costs. 

The Court made two major findings. First, the 8-1 decision authored by Justice Stevens held that Shell was not liable at all because it did not “arrange for” disposal of a hazardous substance. The second major finding was that the facts supported an apportionment of the site remediation costs and that the railroad share of those costs should be 9%. 

Since the case raises several interesting questions, I’ll break the discussion down into separate posts. Let’s first talk about the fact that Shell was found to have no liability.

Since Shell was not an owner or operator of the site, the only PRP category that could fit was “arranger” liability. There have been many cases that have imposed liability on companies that have “arranged for the disposal” of hazardous substances.   Interesting, Superfund does not define the term so the Court decided it was time to define it. The Ninth Circuit, based on prior cases, held that someone who sells a useful product but is aware that some of it will spill is liable as an arranger. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that an arranger must take intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance. The fact that Shell had knowledge of the spills was not sufficient to satisfy the intent element that can be found in the “plain language” of the terms of the statute. The Court said:

While it is true that in some instances an entity’s knowledge that its product will be leaked, spilled, dumped, or otherwise discarded may provide evidence of the entity’s intent to dispose of its hazardous wastes, knowledge alone is insufficient to prove that an entity “planned for” the disposal, particularly when the disposal occurs as a peripheral result of the legitimate sale of an unused, useful product. In order to qualify as an arranger, Shell must have entered into the sale of D-D with the intention that at least a portion of the product be disposed of during the transfer process by one or more of the methods described in Section 6903(3). Here, the facts found by the District Court do not support such a conclusion.

When I first saw this explanation, I thought it was a monumental change from the past. Upon further reflection, maybe not so much. 

Maybe the Supreme Court is just kicking the proverbial verbal can down the road a little bit. It appears that the new question is: what do the terms “intention” and “planned for” really mean? Based on the Court’s language, I am certain that if Shell had included, as a term of the sale, that B&B would agree “that during the process of the transfer of the chemical, B&B shall leak some of it onto the ground,” Shell would have been hooked.  On the other hand, the Court made it clear that since Shell knew of the releases, but did nothing other than to take steps to encourage its distributors to reduce the likelihood of the spills, the necessary “intent” was not present. So what’s in between? What if Shell had known of the spills and had not encouraged its distributors to reduce the likelihood of the spills (a fact scenario which is much more likely in most situations)? What if Shell had a contract with its common carrier that said that the carrier will not inform Shell of any spills? Will willful blindness avoid an intent finding? We’ll just have to wait for the next set of facts.

With regard to our definitional problem, I would note an interesting fact that did not seem to bother the Court: Beginning in the mid-1960s, Shell directed its buyers to create and maintain bulk storage facilities to receive its product rather than to continue to deliver the product in 30 and 55-gallon drums. Presumably this was advantageous to Shell. But as the Court later noted, Shell’s mandated system caused spills to be "commonplace" (there was no reference to spills occurring when the barrel system was used). A cynical person might say that someone who requires a change from a system of no releases to one that virtually guarantees releases, particularly when the change results in an advantage to the supplier, has “planned for” and ”intended” a disposal. Luckily, neither the Supreme Court nor I are cynics.

Another very interesting aspect of this issue was raised by a question during oral argument. Shell’s counsel was asked what would be the difference if the transfer of ownership of product did not occur until the final placement of the product in the tank and that, during that process, the spilling occurred. The response was that “Shell would have been the owner of the waste.” The majority found, however, that the product had been shipped “FOB Destination” and that, at the time of the spills, the chemicals had come under B&B’s "stewardship." In essence, once the truck passed over the property line to B&B’s facility, the Court deemed B&B to be the owner of the product and, in turn, the owner of the spills. If the Court had found that Shell Oil remained the owner of the product until it was in B&B’s tank, Shell would have been liable. You might say that Shell avoided liability by the length of a football field. The dissent by Justice Ginsberg makes the interesting point that

CERCLA liability, or the absence thereof, should not turn, in any part, on such an eminently shipper-fixable specification as “FOB Destination.”

So what are some of the practical results to take from the holding of arranger liability in the case?  You need to talk to your attorney for his/her advise, but allow me to throw out some possibilities:

• Any seller of products containing a hazardous substance should consider including, in the sale document and on a warning label attached to the product, terminology that it is the intention of the seller that none of its product be released into the environment and that buyer should not allow the spilling, leaking, or other disposal into the air, ground or water at any time. And it might be helpful to add: “We really, really mean it.”
• A term of the sale might be that notwithstanding the terms of any shipping documents to the contrary, buyer agrees to become the owner of the product no later than the moment the product crosses the buyer’s property line. 
• If the buyer wants some protection, they should consider a contract term that says that the buyer does not accept or own any product until it is completely within the confines of a tank or has been delivered to the warehouse and the delivery person has left the premises, or at least gone on break. 

I don’t know that any of these will work, but I can say that if “intention” is the new litmus test, putting your intentions in writing might not be a bad idea (even if they might be technically impossible).

Next up, tracking the railroads' liability.

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