Another Nail In The Arranger Liability Coffin

If someone moves a hazardous substance from their property to a property owned by another and the substance is released into the soil or groundwater, that party can be liable for the resulting damages under a theory of arranger liability under CERCLA. The tough question is usually the level of proof necessary to show that the party caused such a transfer. In the recent case of DVL, Inc. v. General Electric Co., et al., the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York set a rational, but surprisingly high, bar for that proof.

Before setting out the facts, I should point out that the Court acknowledged that there is a relaxation of traditional causation principles under CERCLA:

[T]he party seeking costs need only show that there was a release or threatened release, which caused incurrence of response cost, and that the defendant generated hazardous waste at the cleanup site. What is not required is that the government (or another authorized party) show that a specific defendant’s waste caused incurrence of cleanup costs. CERCLA thus “relaxes” but does not eliminate the causation requirement: a plaintiff need not show a causal link between that particular waste and the response costs the plaintiff incurred, but it must demonstrate that a defendant deposited hazardous waste at the site in question.

While the Court was agreeable to allowing the use of circumstantial evidence to prove the relaxed causation standard, it found that such evidence did not exist in this case.

In DVL, Inc., the plaintiff owned property that was 150 feet “down-gradient” from a property owned and operated by General Electric for the production of capacitors and electrical components. It was undisputed that the GE site was contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Although GE never owned or operated any portion of the DVL site, the DVL site was found to be heavily contaminated with PCBs. (DVL had made no investigation of the site when it purchased the property for $500,000 in foreclosure in 2002).

Despite the fact that the DVL property was down-gradient from the GE site, two monitoring wells placed between the properties consistently tested non-detect for PCBs. As such, if the contamination was traveling to the DVL site from the GE site, it apparently was not doing so via the tested aquifer. As a result, there were only two remaining possibilities: the contaminant was being physically transported from the GE site and allowed to be released on the DVL site or the contaminant was moving next door via storm water runoff.

With regard to the physical transportation theory, the plaintiff could produce no evidence that anyone from GE had transported materials to the DVL site. Although there was some testimony that electrical transformers containing PCBs could have leaked on the DVL site, there was no showing that they were GE transformers.

Turning to the possibility of surface water transport, the testimony showed that such water did, in fact, flow from the GE property to the DVL site but there was no proof that the water contained any PCBs. The Court noted:

DVL has not presented an expert to opine that [the surface water had PCB contamination] and that this migration of surface water explains the contamination at the DVL site. In the absence of eyewitness testimony or other direct evidence, and without expert opinion linking GE to the contamination at the DVL site, the circumstantial evidence DVL cites does not provide the Court with a basis for denying GE’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

The case is an interesting read for causation in lateral migration cases because it is a situation that so often arises. The question in these cases is always: How did the contamination get from there to here? For the plaintiff, the clean wells between the properties presented an almost insurmountable problem because if the contamination was not traveling underground, how else could it have been conveyed from the upstream property? The Court’s answer was likely the correct one; that is, either someone must have seen the release of the hazardous substance from a GE activity (either the delivery of the hazardous waste onto the property or the sale of a GE transformer that was seen leaking) or expert testimony would need to be used to fill the gap regarding the unknown delivery. For example, if storm water transported the contamination from the GE site to the DVL site, testing might establish that the contamination was confined to the surface runoff paths and the contamination was greatest on the surface and at the property border and decreased away from property border and at depth. While expert testimony is never cheap, the plaintiff was seeking the recovery of cleanup costs that were in excess of $1 million dollars. (I should note that it is possible that this analysis was done and an expert could not support the theory, though the opinion does not give that impression).

While the Court gave lip service to the prior case law that there is a “relaxed standard” for arranger liability under CERCLA, it certainly did not give the plaintiff in this case much benefit of the doubt, even though the Court was simply considering a motion for summary judgment. The Court made it clear that for arranger liability, you must show how the defendant’s hazardous material got from there to here -- and for this showing, close is not good enough.

 

RELATED POSTS: R.I.P. Superfund Arranger Liability: 1980-2010

                                   Burlington Northern: The Shell Game of Shipping

BURLINGTON NORTHERN (PART 1): The Shell Game Of Shipping

Just when you think you have them figured out, the Supreme Court throws a curve ball.

Much will be written about the recent United States Supreme Court case of Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company, et al. vs. United States, et al., which was handed down on May 4, 2009. It is one of those decisions in the environmental arena that answers some questions while raising new ones.

An understanding of the facts is critically important to understand the ruling, so I would encourage you to read the decision. However, the short version of the operative facts is that a fairly small chemical distributor in California known as Brown and Bryant, Inc. (“B&B”) was the owner and operator of a plant that repackaged agricultural chemicals. The plant sat on a 4.7 acre parcel. About 1 acre of this parcel was leased from two railroads. One of the products made by B&B included a chemical sold by Shell Oil Company. Shell Oil shipped the product to B&B in bulk. During delivery of the product, Shell was aware that B&B occasionally had minor spills.

Not surprisingly, the site was found to have soil and groundwater contamination and, in 1988, the California Environmental Regulatory Agency ordered B&B to clean the soil and groundwater. As is often the case, B&B closed shop and the site was listed on the National Priority List in 1989. EPA, in trying to find someone to do the cleanup, quickly identified the railroads and Shell Oil, which were named as potentially responsible parties (PRPs). The theory against the railroads was based on ownership liability, even though the portion they owned did not require remediation. The theory against Shell was that they delivered chemicals which they knew or should have known would be spilled and therefore “arranged” for the disposal of a hazardous substance. Since the United States and the State of California had expended costs at the site for cleanup, they brought an action for cost recovery seeking over $8 million in response costs. 

The Court made two major findings. First, the 8-1 decision authored by Justice Stevens held that Shell was not liable at all because it did not “arrange for” disposal of a hazardous substance. The second major finding was that the facts supported an apportionment of the site remediation costs and that the railroad share of those costs should be 9%. 

Since the case raises several interesting questions, I’ll break the discussion down into separate posts. Let’s first talk about the fact that Shell was found to have no liability.

Since Shell was not an owner or operator of the site, the only PRP category that could fit was “arranger” liability. There have been many cases that have imposed liability on companies that have “arranged for the disposal” of hazardous substances.   Interesting, Superfund does not define the term so the Court decided it was time to define it. The Ninth Circuit, based on prior cases, held that someone who sells a useful product but is aware that some of it will spill is liable as an arranger. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that an arranger must take intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance. The fact that Shell had knowledge of the spills was not sufficient to satisfy the intent element that can be found in the “plain language” of the terms of the statute. The Court said:

While it is true that in some instances an entity’s knowledge that its product will be leaked, spilled, dumped, or otherwise discarded may provide evidence of the entity’s intent to dispose of its hazardous wastes, knowledge alone is insufficient to prove that an entity “planned for” the disposal, particularly when the disposal occurs as a peripheral result of the legitimate sale of an unused, useful product. In order to qualify as an arranger, Shell must have entered into the sale of D-D with the intention that at least a portion of the product be disposed of during the transfer process by one or more of the methods described in Section 6903(3). Here, the facts found by the District Court do not support such a conclusion.

When I first saw this explanation, I thought it was a monumental change from the past. Upon further reflection, maybe not so much. 

Maybe the Supreme Court is just kicking the proverbial verbal can down the road a little bit. It appears that the new question is: what do the terms “intention” and “planned for” really mean? Based on the Court’s language, I am certain that if Shell had included, as a term of the sale, that B&B would agree “that during the process of the transfer of the chemical, B&B shall leak some of it onto the ground,” Shell would have been hooked.  On the other hand, the Court made it clear that since Shell knew of the releases, but did nothing other than to take steps to encourage its distributors to reduce the likelihood of the spills, the necessary “intent” was not present. So what’s in between? What if Shell had known of the spills and had not encouraged its distributors to reduce the likelihood of the spills (a fact scenario which is much more likely in most situations)? What if Shell had a contract with its common carrier that said that the carrier will not inform Shell of any spills? Will willful blindness avoid an intent finding? We’ll just have to wait for the next set of facts.

With regard to our definitional problem, I would note an interesting fact that did not seem to bother the Court: Beginning in the mid-1960s, Shell directed its buyers to create and maintain bulk storage facilities to receive its product rather than to continue to deliver the product in 30 and 55-gallon drums. Presumably this was advantageous to Shell. But as the Court later noted, Shell’s mandated system caused spills to be "commonplace" (there was no reference to spills occurring when the barrel system was used). A cynical person might say that someone who requires a change from a system of no releases to one that virtually guarantees releases, particularly when the change results in an advantage to the supplier, has “planned for” and ”intended” a disposal. Luckily, neither the Supreme Court nor I are cynics.

Another very interesting aspect of this issue was raised by a question during oral argument. Shell’s counsel was asked what would be the difference if the transfer of ownership of product did not occur until the final placement of the product in the tank and that, during that process, the spilling occurred. The response was that “Shell would have been the owner of the waste.” The majority found, however, that the product had been shipped “FOB Destination” and that, at the time of the spills, the chemicals had come under B&B’s "stewardship." In essence, once the truck passed over the property line to B&B’s facility, the Court deemed B&B to be the owner of the product and, in turn, the owner of the spills. If the Court had found that Shell Oil remained the owner of the product until it was in B&B’s tank, Shell would have been liable. You might say that Shell avoided liability by the length of a football field. The dissent by Justice Ginsberg makes the interesting point that

CERCLA liability, or the absence thereof, should not turn, in any part, on such an eminently shipper-fixable specification as “FOB Destination.”

So what are some of the practical results to take from the holding of arranger liability in the case?  You need to talk to your attorney for his/her advise, but allow me to throw out some possibilities:

  • Any seller of products containing a hazardous substance should consider including, in the sale document and on a warning label attached to the product, terminology that it is the intention of the seller that none of its product be released into the environment and that buyer should not allow the spilling, leaking, or other disposal into the air, ground or water at any time. And it might be helpful to add: “We really, really mean it.”
  • A term of the sale might be that notwithstanding the terms of any shipping documents to the contrary, buyer agrees to become the owner of the product no later than the moment the product crosses the buyer’s property line. 
  • If the buyer wants some protection, they should consider a contract term that says that the buyer does not accept or own any product until it is completely within the confines of a tank or has been delivered to the warehouse and the delivery person has left the premises, or at least gone on break. 

I don’t know that any of these will work, but I can say that if “intention” is the new litmus test, putting your intentions in writing might not be a bad idea (even if they might be technically impossible).

Next up, tracking the railroads' liability.